. . Do you have any idea how many people there are in the
world who like to force stuff on people and have stuff forced
on them? Tons! And then they make a fuss . . .
Where does life-negation lie, a question here construed as curiously pursuing that particular location (lair) at which a certain life-negation (there alluding to a jargon in Nietzsche’s oeuvre) may be said to veil itself or could be found lodging, is a question of utmost tension; and the response is no else than: life-negation lies in that which is European; where else but in the European.
In the European: and yet not so easy. For what follows such response to the question, whatever that may be, would yet be another explanation. It is in the efforts of explanation, proof, corroboration, justification—precisely: refutations—where life-negation itself feeds on. That which is European consists in that surreptitious escape, consciously or unconsciously, to a dominant herd morality against which Nietzsche’s aphorisms inveigh. The jargon of life-negation is that escape to a dominant herd morality which is European morality, or that intervening effort on the part of European mind to surreptitiously escape his damnation, his suffering—that is, his world fate.
In the meantime, so much terminologies as, fate, morality, Europe, efforts, consciousness and unconsciousness et cetera, all these series of pompous concepts among other concepts in the Nietzschean oeuvre—for purposes of common understanding or meaning—demand a dosage of corroborative efforts in order to be conclusively settled down on tablets or codes, like slowly but intricately accumulating axioms to which subservience ought be bestowed only in order for said concepts to be decisive (decisive is to say, reasonable as good for the standards of European mind). In the European mind, man is the certitude of all things, where life-negation itself does lie and is certified. Said standards of man cast on tablets or codes depict the dominant morality being descried.
Circles upon circles, questions underneath questions, concepts across concepts, reasons behind reasons here and there creep in like the swarm that is man—that is the last man himself. What, where, who, which, when, why, how?—thus ask the last man—and they blink:
‘. . . “What is love?, What is creation?, What is longing?, What is a star?,” thus asks the last man, and he blinks. . . Becoming sick and harboring suspicion are sinful to them: one proceeds carefully. . .’
God is dead. God is dead! Those will be the aphorism that functions as a threshold to a grasping of the overall vocabulary that is Nietzschean. That that which is European despises ‘God is dead’—as (1) the aphorism doesn’t appear to be conducive with the glory circumvolving the moral axioms on the tablets, moral axioms which are no less but the luxury of man in his accumulation of truth fortified by concepts and their meanings, and (2) the aphorism unveils the overall debacle of the European culture of certitude—attests to the dominant persistence of life-negation. Despise, nausea, pity and distress, these were but some of the symptoms traversing the dominion of life-negation. Until and unless such signposts are finally overcome, the proverbial life-affirmation will be deferred accordingly; to the extent that life-negation ever reigns as the stronghold of European dominion.
Life-negation lie nowhere else but in the alterity to the Nietzschean elucidation of love of fate—amor fati—as the jargon overcoming, properly Dionysian in character, itself adumbrates.
‘ . . . Whoever does not merely comprehend the word “Dionysian” but comprehends himself in the word “Dionysian” needs no refutation of Plato or Christianity or Schopenhauer—he smells the decay. . . .’
Life-negation may by synonymy be said to veil itself or could be found lodging at that altitude where European herd morality prospers, since this morality moreover serves as the poignant lair that portrays what is most life-consuming, by imposing limits, dictating norms, and prescribing values. European herd morality is as demonstrated above, that which negates even falsity only to attain its own visions of truth and reason, so that goodness will accord to European standards. Hardly yet fine, one could detect that life-negation attunes to that which is the contra-Dionysian. Such that where do the Dionysian properly lie, there the sought life-negation does not.
In the Appendix to Ecce Homo, where some discarded paragraphs are published, it may be gleaned the revaluation that the Dionysian character tremendously wields apropos the dominating morality and the history of two millennia that was itself Europe:
‘. . . I am solitude become man.— That no word ever reached me, forced me to reach myself.— I should not be possible without a countertype of race, without Germans, without these Germans, without Bismarck, without 1848, without “Wars of Liberation,” without Kant, even without Luther.— The great crimes committed against culture by the Germans are justified in a higher economy of culture.— I want nothing differently, not backward either—I was not permitted to want anything differently.— Amor fati.— Even Christianity becomes necessary: only the highest form, the most dangerous, to one that was most seductive in its No to life, provokes its highest affirmation—me.— What in the end are these two millennia? Our most instructive experiment, a vivisection of life itself.— Merely two millennia!— . . .’
That preceding passage illustrates the tremendous revaluation that love of fate—Amor fati—wields apropos almost everything done in mistake. Error is loved, all for the love of fate. Affirmation of ‘the highest form, the most dangerous.’ The bygone that is two millennia was then and there revaluated to moral justice that no longer despise, nauseate, pity, nor distress; for if there still remains contamination from the bad, the evil, and the false (which are all flagrant symptoms of the lame European morality) revaluation shall by virtue of said contamination appear a mere Dionysian swindle; and the domination life-negation endures, like a stubborn bacteria that cause persistent disease.
Two millennia appears mere insignificant a duration toward the overcoming and the revaluation of values. What the Dionysian proper, or the alterity to life-negation, Platonism, Christianity, moral dominion of the European, and even the truth and falsity dilemma, demonstrates never falls short of no else but life affirmation itself, the revaluation of life-negation; to the point of affirming even the life-negating antics the two millennia had consumed. Two millennia, if and when, to be redeemed would be in the following pathos:
‘. . . To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate every “it was” into a “thus I willed it”—that alone should I call redemption. . . .’
Despite the fact that God is dead, the non-refutation of Plato, Christianity and Schopenhauer, and the two millennia lavishly consumed, the world remains as perfect as it is to the affirmation of life which the Dionysian revaluation illustrates, in Zarathustra:
‘. . . The world is perfect. . . .’
And also in The Antichrist:
‘. . . “The world is perfect”—thus says the instinct of the most spiritual, the Yes-saying instinct; “imperfection, whatever is beneath us, distance, the pathos of distance—even the chandala still belongs to this perfection.”. . .’
What is to be underscored is how revaluation shall overcome the life-negation of the world, from the despise, nausea, pity, and distress emblematic of the European herd morality into an amor fati Dionysian affirmation. What was being called forth by the query where does life-negation lie was the word European, a far-reaching word that exceeds even the geopolitical confines of the European territory, as Section 202 of Beyond Good and Evil emphasized above poignantly drew. Now, where does life negation lie?: it lies in that which is European—in effect it lies everywhere! Everywhere, ‘to force stuff on people and have stuff forced on them’ thus marks the saddest of decay.
 This passage was a line uttered by a certain Midori Kobayashi a teenage girl playing a secondary-character role, culled from the 1987 Japanese fiction “Norwegian Wood” by Haruki Murakami, trans. Jay Rubin. (New York: Vintage International Inc., 2000), 170.
 This view specifically chooses Nietzsche’s 1886 book “Beyond Good and Evil: A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,” the book where the sign Europe itself was used to elucidate the life-negation the West is traversing, particularly Section 202 a line of which reads: ‘. . . for here lies our novel insight. We have found that in all major moral judgments Europe is now of one mind, including even the countries dominated by the influence of Europe: plainly one now knows in Europe what Socrates thought he did not know and what that famous old serpent once promised to teach—today one “knows” what is good and evil. . . . that which here believes it knows, that which here glorifies itself with its praises and reproaches, calling itself good, that is the instinct of the herd animal, man, which has scored a breakthrough and attained prevalence and predominance over other instincts—and this development is continuing in accordance with the growing physiological approximation and assimilation of which it is the symptom. . . .’ In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 2000) 305. The elucidated Section 202, could have been reproduced here in toto, that is if spaces are of luxury.
 Friedrich Nietzsche. “Ecce Homo.” In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), 728-729.
 Friedrich Nietzsche. Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1974), 181.
 Friedrich Nietzsche. “Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” In The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1976), 124.
 Ibid., 129.
 Friedrich Nietzsche. “Appendix to Ecce Homo.” In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 2000), 799.
 Friedrich Nietzsche. “Thus Spoke Zarathustra.” In The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1976), 251.
 Ibid., 389.
 Friedrich Nietzsche. “The Antichrist.” In The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1976), 645.
Murakami, Haruki. Norwegian Wood, 170. Translated by Jay Rubin. New York: Vintage International Inc., 2000.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Appendix,” In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 799. Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 2000.
_________. “Beyond Good and Evil: A Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future,” In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 305. Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 2000.
__________. “Ecce Homo,” In Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 728-729. Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 2000.
__________. Gay Science, 181. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, Inc., 1974.
__________. “The Antichrist,” In The Portable Nietzsche, 645. Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking Penguin, 1976.
__________. “Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” In The Portable Nietzsche, 124. Edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking Penguin, 1976.